It must be recognized that World War Three has begun. The question is “when” to make a checkmate move on Putin, as he will continue his aggression through Europe until he is confronted. Many in the U.S. and West believe that he will halt after he neutralizes Ukraine. However, his decision to arm Belarus with nuclear weapons confirms his next move, which is corridor access to Kaliningrad through Poland and Lithuania. If successful, Europe will be checkmated.
Thus the question of whether to confront him with military force or pure economic measures. The question is also “when”. If our strategic planners are confident that regime change in Moscow can be affected by economic measures alone, before he obtains his Kaliningrad corridor, then actual war may be avoided. However, if this assumption is faulty, the West will be at a military disadvantage in its eventual military confrontation in Europe.
Since early 2021, the West has been asleep during Putin’s military preparations and planning for a Ukraine action. The focus on Afghanistan has found the U.S. tardy in responding to this possible threat. It will be interesting to learn the internal deliberations of the Biden national security team in these early months. However, now that Putin has acted, our options are limited. We likely must consider the most severe economic actions, including the termination of all Western oil imports from Russia, and offsetting these losses with increased U.S./OPEC oil production. But it is this writer’s opinion that these actions will be too little and too late to preserve an independent Ukraine state.
The Russian forces arrayed around Kiev are sitting ducks. Small forces armed with Javelins and Stingers could devastate the encampments, which are probably facing food and fuel shortages anyway. Where are those “small forces”? Where are the CIA contractors? Where is Blackwater? Where is a “Lincoln Brigade”? Where is Biden’s thinking? Is anyone in the defense establishment offering salient plans?
It is understandable that Putin’s use of theater nuclear weapons should be avoided. However, insurgents not directly attributable to NATO or the U.S. could inflict sufficient damage and embarrassment to Moscow that regime change could become a serious discussion within the Russian defense establishment. The current Russian military position is now so susceptible to a major defeat that advantage must be taken. Hesitation now will in the future be considered another “Munich” moment.